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The Ethical Justification of Equal Candidacy for Organ Transplantation
in Alcoholic Patients
Peter A. DePergola II
University of Massachusetts Medical School
College of Our Lady of the Elms
ABSTRACT
An increasingly blurred understanding of the distinctive challenges posed to
transplantation medicine and, by extension, public health, by the debilitating reality of
alcoholism suggests a critical need to revisit the relationship between causality,
candidacy, and culpability in light of substance addiction. This essay grounds its
arguments in two, straightforward premises: (i) compassionate medical practice understood as the sympathetic willingness to enter into the existential suffering of another
in order to ameliorate the anguish invoked by disease - rests on the fiduciary relationship
shared between provider and patient; and, (ii) allocating medical goods according to
moral desert rather than existential disposition undermines the fundamental nature of
medicine and the functioning of the provider-patient relationship. Drawing from this
syllogism, the aim and proposal of this essay posits the argument that employing moral
desert as an allocation criteria to inhibit alcoholic patients from equal consideration and
treatment is, and ought to remain, at odds with the fundamental nature of medicine and
the functioning of the provider-patient relationship.
Keywords: Transplantation Ethics, Alcoholism, Moral Responsibility, Addiction Neuroethics

1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview
The harmful use of alcohol (HUA) causes approximately 2.5 million global deaths
each year, including 320,000 individuals between the ages of 15 and 29.1 The third
leading risk factor of ill health world-wide, alcohol led to the death of one person every
two minutes in the Americas in 2002.2 In the same year, approximately 5.4 percent of all
deaths in the Americas were attributed to alcohol, compared to the 3.7 percent global
figure – some 68 percent greater than the world average. Alcohol consumption is related
to over 60 health conditions, ranging from those resulting from excessive alcohol
consumption during pregnancy to intentional and non-intentional injuries, cancers,
cardiovascular diseases, liver disease, and neuropsychiatric conditions, including alcohol
dependence.3 An array of alcohol-related problems has a devastating impact on
individuals and their families, and can seriously inhibit community life. HUA is one of
the most common modifiable and preventable risk factors for major communicable
1. World Health Organization (WHO), Global Strategy to Reduce the Harmful Use of Alcohol
(Geneva: WHO Press, 2010), 1-38; see especially p. 3.
2. Pan American Health Organization, Alcohol and Public Health in the Americas: A Case for
Action (Washington, DC: Pan American Health Organization, 2007), 1-50; see especially p. 1.
3. Pan American Health Organization, Alcohol and Public Health, 1-50; see especially p. 1.

diseases, and emerging evidence suggests that alcohol abuse contributes to health burdens
caused by tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS.4
Alcohol has several and contrasting associations. A glass of wine can symbolize
love, friendship, relaxation, and enjoyment. It can represent romance, success, beginnings
and endings, good news and good company. But sadly, these occasions contrast with the
associations of alcohol with drunken violence in towns and cities, terminal disease on
medical wards, debt in families, and death on roads. It also contrasts with the
enslavement that is alcoholism, or alcohol addiction. Addiction is concerned with the
subjective experience of continuing in a habitual behavior which is recognized at some
level (by the subject or others) as being undesirable. It is a concern with behavior in
which motivation appears to be disordered, or in which the usual human experience of
free choice appears to be violated.5
Nevertheless, medical and moral arguments have been advanced in response to
the question of whether alcoholic patients with liver disease should be given lower
priority for liver transplantation than those whose disease is not alcohol related.
According to the medical argument, alcoholics should be given lower priority because
their survival rate is lower, owing to a presumed probability of relapse into alcohol abuse.
According to the moral argument, alcoholics should be given lower priority because their
moral vice of heavy drinking makes them responsible for their condition and effectively
forfeits their claim to extraordinary medical treatment, such as transplantation.6 Contrary
to these flawed positions, this essay will argue in favor of equal consideration for organ
transplantation in alcoholic patients on both medical and moral grounds.
1.2 Analytical Method
An increasingly blurred understanding of the distinctive challenges posed to
transplantation medicine and, by extension, public health, by the debilitating reality of
alcoholism suggests a critical need to revisit the relationship between causality,
candidacy, and culpability in light of substance addiction. The be sure, the issues of
immediate import to the conversation over the licitness of equal candidacy for organ
transplantation in alcoholic patients in light of changing scientific, medical, and moral
traditions are manifold, and any singular analysis of topics, no matter how sweeping, will
unavoidably fall short of adequacy. This essay thus endeavors to briefly address but
three: (i) alcohol addiction, (ii) transplantation candidacy, and (iii) moral responsibility.
It grounds its arguments in two, straightforward premises: (i) compassionate
medical practice – understood as the sympathetic willingness to enter into the existential
suffering of another in order to ameliorate the anguish invoked by disease7 – rests on the
4. WHO, Global Strategy, 1-38; see especially p. 3
5. Christopher C. H. Cook, Alcohol, Addiction and Christian Ethics (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2006), 1-36; see especially pp. 9-20.
6. Walter Glannon, “Responsibility, Alcoholism, and Liver Transplantation,” Journal of Medicine
and Philosophy 23, no. 1 (1998): 31-49; see especially p. 31.
7. “Existential suffering” is an intentionally broad term employed herein to include physiological,
emotional, psychological, spiritual, and other idiosyncratic manifestations of suffering.

fiduciary relationship shared between provider and patient; and (ii) allocating medical
goods according to moral desert rather than existential disposition undermines the
fundamental nature of medicine and the functioning of the provider-patient relationship.
Drawing from this syllogism, the aim and proposal of this essay is to examine the notions
of alcohol addiction, transplantation candidacy, and moral responsibility with the
intention of positing the argument that employing moral desert as an allocation criteria to
inhibit alcoholic patients from equal consideration and treatment is, and ought to remain,
at odds with the fundamental nature of medicine and the functioning of the providerpatient relationship.
To secure the justification of this thesis, the essay will move in four parts. First, it
will address alcoholism as a public health issue, including a specific analysis of (i) the
pathophysiology and effects of alcoholism, (ii) alcoholism as a public health threat, and
(iii) global strategies to address alcoholism. Second, it will address the neuroethics of
alcoholism, including a specific analysis of (i) the addicted brain, (ii) the neurobiological
basis of moral reasoning, and (iii) autonomy and alcoholism. Third, it will address organ
transplantation and alcoholism, including a specific analysis of (i) liver transplantation
and alcoholism, (ii) transplant outcome and survival benefit for alcoholic patients, and
(iii) predictors of alcoholic relapse after liver transplantation. Finally, it will address
moral responsibility and alcoholism, including a specific analysis of (i) free will, moral
choice, and alcoholism, (ii) moral responsibility and alcoholism, and (iii) the providerpatient relationship in the context of alcoholism.
2. ALCOHOLISM AS PUBLIC HEALTH ISSUE
2.1 Alcoholism: Pathophysiology and Effects
Addiction treatment trials often employ the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR) definition of alcohol use disorders (AUD) to define
study participants. The definition of alcohol dependence requires significantly harmful
impact caused by at least three of seven target conditions within a single calendar year.
The dependence symptoms include tolerance; withdrawal; increased amounts of alcohol
consumed over time; ineffective efforts to reduce use; interference with professional or
personal life; significant amount of time spent obtaining, using, and recovering from
alcohol; or continued use of alcohol despite harmful sequelae.8
The DSM-V has combined criteria for alcohol dependence and abuse into a single
term: AUD.9 Craving was added to the diagnostic criteria and at least two target
conditions are required for AUD. Although approved pharmacologic treatment options
for patients with AUD are limited in number, recent trials describe several alternative
approaches to reducing alcohol consumption. These include the use of antipsychotics,
8. Hence, alcohol abuse is defined broadly and requires the presence of at least one of the four
abuse criteria for diagnosis. See Robin C. Wackernah, Matthew J. Minnick, and Peter Clapp, “Alcohol Use
Disorder: Pathophysiology, Effects, and Pharmacologic Options for Treatment,” Substance Abuse and
Rehabilitation 5 (2014): 1-12; see especially pp. 1-2.
9. Wackernah et al., “Alcohol Use Disorder,” 1-12; see especially p. 2.

antidepressants, anticonvulsants, and other drugs under the rationale that these substances
target neurotransmitter systems that have been shown to undergo changes with chronic
exposure to alcohol.10
The acute and chronic effects of alcohol on brain pathology help to rationalize the
investigations of psychotropic drugs in the treatment of AUD.11 Alcohol, like other
addictive drugs, stimulates release of the neurotransmitter dopamine from cells
originating in the ventral tegmental area (VTA).12 Following exposure to alcohol,
dopamine released into the nucleus accumbens (NAc) and prefrontal cortex has been
postulated to reinforce drinking behaviors or make the experience of drinking more
salient. This electrochemical activation of neurons is controlled by a balance between
excitatory and inhibitory neurotransmitters.13
Alcohol acutely inhibits the flow of ions through N-methyl-D-asparate (NDMA)type glutamine receptors and enhances the activity of glutamate, γ-aminobutyric acid
(GABA) receptors channels, producing an overall inhibitory effect on neurons.14 The
desire to relieve anxiety and negative sensations of withdrawal can contribute to relapse
drinking and compulsive behaviors that characterize alcohol dependence. Pharmacologic
strategies to reduce drinking in patients with AUD attempt to remedy the imbalance
between excitatory and inhibitory pathways, and relieve the intense craving for alcohol
brought about by neuroadaptation.15
Even in healthy individuals, alcohol is toxic to most organ systems at doses above
one to two drinks per day.16 Long-term exposure to alcohol generally increases the risk of
damage to gastrointestinal, cardiovascular, immune, nervous, and other systems. Alcohol
can promote gastrointestinal bleeding through inflammation of the esophagus and
stomach, or through vomiting that can damage gastrointestinal mucosa. Acute
pancreatitis is more prevalent in alcoholics than in the general population and can
progress to chronic disease or pancreatic cancer with prolonged abuse. Accumulation of
fat in the liver as a result of decreased oxidation of fatty acids and other metabolic
changes can progress to fatty liver disease, alcohol-induced hepatitis, and cirrhosis.17
The effects of heavy drinking can range from left ventricular impairment and
arrhythmia to heart failure as a result of limited contractility of the heart muscle. Binge
10. Wackernah et al., “Alcohol Use Disorder,” 1-12; see especially p. 2.
11. In particular, neurotransmitter pathways involved in learning and reward have proven to be
effective targets, based on mechanisms of the action of two currently approved AUD drugs: acamprosate
and naltrexone. See Wackernah et al., “Alcohol Use Disorder,” 1-12; see especially p. 2.
12. VTA is a component of the neuronal circuit known as the mesolimbic dopamine system that
has been associated with motivation and reward. See Wackernah et al., “Alcohol Use Disorder,” 1-12; see
especially p. 2.
13. Changes in the GABA system contribute to the anxiogenic and aversive effects of alcohol
withdrawal and can persist over long periods of abstinence from alcohol. See Wackernah et al., “Alcohol
Use Disorder,” 1-12; see especially pp. 2-3.
14. Wackernah et al., “Alcohol Use Disorder,” 1-12; see especially pp. 2-3.
15. Wackernah et al., “Alcohol Use Disorder,” 1-12; see especially p. 3.
16. Wackernah et al., “Alcohol Use Disorder,” 1-12; see especially p. 3.
17. Wackernah et al., “Alcohol Use Disorder,” 1-12; see especially p. 3.

drinking can produce atrial and ventricular arrhythmias, even in individuals who have no
other evidence of heart disease – a syndrome known as “holiday heart.”18 Alcoholdependent individuals may experience peripheral neuropathy characterized by numbness
and tingling, especially in the hands and feet. A progressive neurological syndrome that
affects walking and posture, often accompanied by nystagmus, can result from atrophy of
the cerebellum due to alcohol toxicity. Less common are neurologic syndromes that
result from thiamine deficiency secondary to heavy drinking. Wernicke’s syndrome
consists of encephalopathy, uncoordinated muscle movement, eye and muscle weakness;
and Korsakoff’s syndrome is characterized by amnesia.19
2.2 Alcoholism qua Public Health Threat
HUA has serious effects on public health and is considered a primary risk factor
for poor health globally. HUA is broad and includes drinking that poses debilitating
health consequences for the drinker and society at large, as well as the patterns of
drinking associated with adverse health outcomes. HUA compromises both individual
and social development, and can ruin the lives of individuals, devastate families, and
damage the social fabric of communities. As mentioned above, HUA is a significant
contributor to the global burden of disease and is listed as the third leading risk factor for
premature deaths and disabilities in the world.20
The degree of risk for HUA varies with age, sex, and other biological
characteristics of the consumer as well as with the setting and context in which drinking
takes place. Some vulnerable and at-risk groups have increased susceptibility to the toxic,
psychoactive, and dependence-producing properties of ethanol. At the same time, low
risk patterns of alcohol consumption at the individual level may not be associated with
occurrence or significantly increased probability of negative health and social
consequences. Reducing HUA by effective policy measures that provide a relevant
infrastructure is much more than a public health issue. It is also a developmental issue,
since the level of risk in developing countries is much higher than in high-income
countries where individuals are protected by laws and interventions.21
A substantial scientific knowledge base exists on the effectiveness and costeffectiveness of strategies and interventions to prevent and reduce alcohol-related harm.22
Although much of the evidence comes from high-income countries, the results of metaanalyses and reviews provide sufficient knowledge to inform policy recommendations.
With improved awareness, there are increased responses at regional, notational, and
international levels. Yet these responses are often fragmented and do not always
correspond to the magnitude of impact on health and social development.23 The present
commitment to reducing HUA provides an excellent opportunity for improving health
18. Wackernah et al., “Alcohol Use Disorder,” 1-12; see especially p. 3.
19. Wackernah et al., “Alcohol Use Disorder,” 1-12; see especially p. 3.
20. WHO, Global Strategy, 1-38; see especially p. 5.
21. WHO, Global Strategy, 1-38; see especially p. 3.
22. WHO, Global Strategy, 1-38; see especially p. 6.
23. WHO, Global Strategy, 1-38; see especially p. 6.

and social well-being and for reducing the existing disease burden attributed by alcohol.
There are at least seven considerable challenges that must be accounted for in national
and global public health initiatives and programs, of which this essay will address four.24
A first challenge is increasing global action and international cooperation.25 The
current health, cultural, and market trends worldwide indicate that HUA will remain a
global health issue. These trends should be recognized, and appropriate responses should
be implemented at all levels. Second, intersectoral action must be ensured.26 The
diversity of alcohol-related problems and measures necessary to reduce alcohol-related
harm suggests the need for comprehensive action across numerous sectors. Policies to
reduce HUA must reach beyond the health sector and appropriately engage sectors such
as development, justice, social welfare, trade, education, and others.27
Third, appropriate attention must be accorded to this issue.28 Preventing and
reducing HUA is infrequently prioritized by decision makers despite compelling evidence
of its debilitating public health effects. Unless this problem is given the attention it
deserves, the spread of harmful drinking practices and norms will continue. Fourth,
equity must be a focal point.29 Population-wide rates of drinking alcoholic beverages are
markedly lower in poor societies than in wealthier ones. However, for a given amount of
consumption, poorer populations often experience disproportionately higher levels of
alcohol-attributed harm. This suggests an urgent need to develop and implement effective
policies and programs that reduce such social disparities.30
2.3 Global Strategies to Address Alcoholism
National and international efforts can produce better results when they are
supported by regional and global action within agreed policy frames. Hence, the purpose
of an effective global strategy is to support and compliment public health policies in
Member States. The vision behind the global strategy to reduce alcohol-related harm is
improved health and social outcomes for individuals, families, and communities with
considerably reduced morbidity and mortality due to HUA. A robust global strategy will
promote and support local, regional, and global actions to prevent and reduce HUA. One
global strategy, developed by the World Health Organization and endorsed by the Sixtythird World Health Assembly,31 aims to guide action at all levels. These
recommendations set priority areas for global action, and offer a portfolio of policy
options and measures to consider for implementation. As such, they can nuanced as
appropriate at the national level, taking into account relevant circumstances, such as
24. Those not discussed include balancing differing interests, considering context in
recommending actions, and strengthening information. See WHO, Global Strategy, 1-38; see especially pp.
6-7.
25. WHO, Global Strategy, 1-38; see especially p. 6.
26. WHO, Global Strategy, 1-38; see especially p. 6.
27. WHO, Global Strategy, 1-38; see especially p. 6.
28. WHO, Global Strategy, 1-38; see especially p. 6.
29. WHO, Global Strategy, 1-38; see especially p. 7.
30. WHO, Global Strategy, 1-38; see especially p. 7.
31. WHO, Global Strategy, 1-38; see especially p. 3.

religious and cultural contexts, public health priorities, and existing resources, capacities,
and capabilities.32
Five aims comprise the WHO’s global strategy.33 First, the it suggests raised
global awareness of the magnitude and nature of health, social, and economic problems
caused by HUA, and increased governmental commitment to address HUA. Second, it
suggests a strengthened knowledge base around the magnitude and determinants of
alcohol-related harm and on effective interventions to reduce and prevent such harm.
Third, it suggests increased technical support to, and enhanced capacity of, Member
States for preventing HUA and managing AUDs and associated health conditions.34
Fourth, it suggests strengthened partnerships and better coordination among stakeholders
and increased mobilization of resources necessary for appropriate and coordinated action
to prevent HUA. Finally, it suggests improved systems for monitoring and surveillance at
different levels, and more effective dissemination and application of the information for
advocacy, policy development, and evaluation purposes. Achieving these five objectives
requires local, regional, and global actions on the levels, patterns, and contexts of alcohol
consumption and the broader social determinants of health.35
The protection of population health by preventing and reducing HUA is a public
health priority. To this end, the WHO offers eight principles to guide the development
and implementation of policies at all levels, of which this essay will address five.36 First,
public policies and interventions to prevent and reduce alcohol-related harm should be
guided and formulated by public health interests and based on clear public health goals
and the best available evidence.37 Second, policies should be equitable and sensitive to
national, religious, and cultural contexts.38 Third, all involved parties must act in ways
that do not undermine the implementation of public policies and interventions to prevent
and reduce HUA.39 Fourth, public health should be given proper respect in relation to
competing interests, and approaches that support that direction should be promoted.40
Finally, individuals and families affected by HUA should have access to affordable and
effective prevention and care services.41 Taken together, these principles reflect the
32. WHO, Global Strategy, 1-38; see especially p. 8.
33. That is, (i) raised global awareness, (ii) strengthened knowledge, (iii) increased technical
support, (iv) strengthened partnerships, and (v) improved systems. See WHO, Global Strategy, 1-38; see
especially p. 8.
34. WHO, Global Strategy, 1-38; see especially p. 8.
35. WHO, Global Strategy, 1-38; see especially p. 8.
36. Those not mentioned include notions that (i) the protection of populations at high risk of harm
attributed to alcohol and those exposed to the effects of harmful drinking by others should be an integral
part of policies addressing HUA; (ii) children, teenagers, and adults who choose not to drink alcoholic
beverages have the right to be supported in their non-drinking behavior and protected from pressures to
drink; and (iii) public policies and interventions to prevent and reduce alcohol-related harm should
encompass all alcoholic beverages and surrogate alcohol. See WHO, Global Strategy, 1-38; see especially
p. 9.
37. WHO, Global Strategy, 1-38; see especially p. 9.
38. WHO, Global Strategy, 1-38; see especially p. 9.
39. WHO, Global Strategy, 1-38; see especially p. 9.
40. WHO, Global Strategy, 1-38; see especially p. 9.
41. WHO, Global Strategy, 1-38; see especially p. 9.

multifaceted determinants of alcohol-related harm and the coordinated multisectoral
actions required to implement effective interventions.
3. THE NEUROETHICS OF ALCOHOLISM
3.1 The Addicted Brain
Communication in the brain is facilitated by neurotransmitters, which are released
from neurons at synapses where they interact as bonds with protein complexes, called
receptors, on the surface of other cells, predominantly at the postsynaptic membrane. The
binding of a neurotransmitter to a receptor transduces a chemical signal that transfers
activity-dependent information. The neurotransmitters can either be taken back up by the
cell for future use by transporters or degraded and removed from the system. In the brain,
pathways are complex integrative systems that contain numerous neurons or nuclei that
relay information throughout a circuit and can be acted upon by other neurotransmitter
systems that also integrate with that region.42 While alcohol has diverse pharmacological
profiles, its acute actions converge primarily on the mesocorticolimbic dopaminergic
system. This pathway originates in the VTA and projects to the NAc, striatum, forebrain,
and prefrontal cortex. The prefrontal cortex coordinates cognitive processes and actions
aimed at an internal goal, while the NAc is believed to integrate information, effect an
appropriate response, and control the motivational value of stimuli and reward
enforcement.43
Immediately after initial exposure to a drug, extracellular levels of accumbal
dopamine increase. Some enhance dopamine release from the presynaptic terminals as a
consequence of increased neuronal activity in the VTA (e.g., alcohol, nicotine, opiates,
and cannabis) while others inhibit the presynaptic uptake by the dopamine transporter
(DAT) in the NAc (e.g., cocaine and amphetamines).44 Alcohol produces a larger
dopamine release that is maintained for longer than that of natural rewards. If exposure to
the drug persists, there may be a loss of homeostatic regulation: a progressive increase in
basal levels of dopamine is accompanied by a reduction in the lesser response to the drug,
resulting in the appearance of tolerance to the drug. During acute alcohol withdrawal, the
levels of dopamine rebound to below basal levels so re-exposure to the drug or a drugrelated cue is often sufficient to increase dopamine levels again. This dopamine response
has been hypothesized to contribute to addictive relapse.45
While dopamine release may modulate the acute rewarding effects of alcohol, it
does not solely mediate drug-seeking behaviors and persistent drug taking. Exposure to
alcohol can have either a direct or indirect effect on numerous neurotransmitter
42. Jhodie R. Duncan and Andrew J. Lawrence, “Molecular Neuroscience and Genetics,” in
Addiction Neuroethics: The Ethics of Addiction Neuroscience Research and Treatment, ed. Adrian Carter,
Wayne Hall, and Judy Illes (San Diego: Academic Press, 2012), 27-54; see especially pp. 28-29.
43. Duncan and Lawrence, “Molecular Neuroscience and Genetics,” 27-54; see especially p. 29.
44. Duncan and Lawrence, “Molecular Neuroscience and Genetics,” 27-54; see especially p. 30.
45. These include serotonergic, noradrenic, glutamatergic, and GABAergic systems. See Duncan
and Lawrence, “Molecular Neuroscience and Genetics,” 27-54; see especially p. 31.

systems.46 Unlike dopamine, which facilitates the response to initial alcohol use, these
additional neurotransmitter systems play a greater role in mediating persistent drug use,
contributing to the inability to stop drug use and relapse after a period of abstinence.47
There are vast numbers of neuropeptides and their receptors present in pathways
that mediate alcohol addiction.48 The role of corticotropin-releasing factor (CFR) is
highlighted as an example of the intricate part that neuropeptides play in mediating
addictive behaviors. Stress, either in the environment or due to alcohol withdrawal, can
induce drug craving, which leads to relapse. The system mediating stress responses
incorporates the hypothalamic pituitary axis (HPA) ad extrahypothalmic regions (such as
the extended amygdala). CRF is a neuropeptide that is responsible for activating the
HPA, where it plays a mediating role in hormonal, autonomic, emotional, and behavioral
responses to stress. Initial exposure to alcohol engages the HPA, but this response
becomes blunted with repeated exposures via feedback systems in response to circulating
hormones.49
CFR-mediated actions on addictive behaviors depend on their interplay at
extrahypothalmic sites. These extrahypothalmic regions become sensitized to CRF after
repeated exposure to alcohol abuse. During withdrawal, these regions become engaged
and hyperactive, thereby increasing local CRF levels and perpetuating negative state of
stress. While stress is sufficient to increase CRF levels in the VTA, it is neuroadaptive
changes induced by prior alcohol abuse that enable the CRF to control local glutamate
release, subsequently activating the dopaminergic system and perpetuating stress-induced
relapse to drug-seeking behaviors.50
3.2 The Neurobiological Basis of Moral Reasoning
The brain region associated with moral reasoning and decision making is the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC). This region is primarily associated with
cognition, but it reaches to other cortical and subcortical regions mediating emotions,
which in turn project to the VMPFC. Interaction between these neural pathways
facilitates the cognitive and affective processes responsible for deliberating and making
rational moral decisions.51 Antonio Damasio has observed that damage to and
dysfunction in the VMPFC significantly impairs both cognitive and affective
processing.52 This is due to the associated projections of the VMPFC to regions beyond
46. Duncan and Lawrence, “Molecular Neuroscience and Genetics,” 27-54; see especially p. 31.
47. Duncan and Lawrence, “Molecular Neuroscience and Genetics,” 27-54; see especially pp. 3032.
48. Duncan and Lawrence, “Molecular Neuroscience and Genetics,” 27-54; see especially p. 37.
49. Duncan and Lawrence, “Molecular Neuroscience and Genetics,” 27-54; see especially pp. 3741.
50. Duncan and Lawrence, “Molecular Neuroscience and Genetics,” 27-54; see especially p. 41.
51. For a superb account of the neurobiological basis of morality, see Christopher Suhler, and
Patricia Churchland, “The Neurobiological Basis of Morality,” in The Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics,
ed. Judy Illes and Barbara J. Sahakian (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 33-58.
52. Antonio Damasio, “Neuroscience and Ethics—Intersections,” American Journal of
Bioethics—AJOB Neuroscience 7, no. 1 (2007): 3-7.

the prefrontal area. The system that supports moral decision making includes the
dorsolateral prefrontal regions as well as “higher-order” association cortices in the
temporal and parietal regions, the early sensory cortices, and several regions of the motor
system, cortically and subcortically,53 as well as other cortical sites.54 Of critical
takeaway here is the notion decision making and emotional systems overlap and interact
within the VMPFC,55 which is damaged by alcohol addiction.
Insofar as the VMPFC is vital for decision making, and both cognitive and
emotional systems are active within the VMPFC, it follows that decision making is a
process both cognitive and emotional. Damasio and colleagues have displayed that
emotional impairment in psychopaths or sociopaths correlate with irrational choices
founded upon faulty moral judgments,56 and a similar impairment is true of individuals
with addiction. Unlike (spontaneous) intuitive moral judgments, considered moral
judgments involve a depth of reflection and formulation of reasons for or against
particular actions.57
This data suggests that the interplay between cognitive and affective processes
ground one’s capacity to actively participate in practical moral reasoning. Both respective
processes are indispensable to the capacity to make considered moral judgments about
conflicting values. Such considered judgments require more than immediate or slightly
delayed responses. That is, moral judgments require some degree of critical reflective
thought, whereby one takes longer to justify actions that pose polarized consequences.58
3.3 Autonomy and Alcoholism
Autonomy is a term with multiple meanings. In its maximal sense, autonomy
means that human beings possess only the desires and beliefs they want to have and make
choices uninfluenced by any factor they have not endorsed. Yet, if autonomy is thus
understood, it is not a goal that human beings can hope to achieve. As finite beings,
individuals are forced to strive for something less grandiose. Certainly, if addiction
threatens autonomy (as it seems to do), then it must be some less extravagant notion of
autonomy that it undermines. In a more minimal sense, then – as the etymology of the
world itself suggests – autonomy (auto nomos, or “self rule”) is simply self-government.
Just as autonomous nations are able to make major decisions of internal and external
policy without undue interference from foreign powers, so autonomous persons are
53. For example, basal ganglia and cerebellum. See Damasio, “Neuroscience and Ethics,” 3-7; see
especially p. 4.
54. For example, insular cortex. See Damasio, “Neuroscience and Ethics,” 3-7; see especially p. 4.
55. Damasio, “Neuroscience and Ethics,” 3-7; see especially p. 4.
56. Damasio, “Neuroscience and Ethics,” 3-7.
57. Damasio, “Neuroscience and Ethics,” 3-7.
58. Thanks in large part to the work of Damasio and other cognitive neuroscientists, the Platonic,
Cartesian, Humean, and Kantian dichotomies of reason versus emotion now represent outdated models of
the mind. The locus of intellectual judgment is not localized to specific areas of the brain but is instead
broadcast over several, broader areas. Hence, this distribution mediates the overlap between cognitive and
affective processes that serves as the neurobiological foundation of moral reasoning. See Walter Glannon,
Brain, Body, and Mind: Neuroethics with a Human Face (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 93114; see especially pp. 99-109.

capable of governing themselves by setting their own short and long-term ends and
choosing the best means of achieving them.59
However, if autonomy is understood as self-rule, it is not yet clear how the loss of
autonomy should be understood. One obvious situation in which autonomy is
compromised or lost is when the self is ruled by another. In the political domain, the loss
of autonomy is almost exclusively described this way. The same kind of phenomenon can
occur, more or less dramatically, in the alcoholic as well. A slave, for instance, whose life
is entirely in the hands of another, is a dramatic example of this phenomenon, while a
dispositionally subservient person might represent a less dramatic instance of this partial
loss of autonomy.60
At first blush, addiction does not seem to involve the loss of autonomy described
above. The alcoholic who suffers loss of autonomy is not under the control of another
person, either partially or necessarily. An addict might be excessively subservient to the
individual who supplies him with alcohol, or with money for alcohol, and therefore have
his autonomy compromised by the rule of another. However, if the addict’s autonomy is
compromised in this way, it marks a consequence of an initial loss of autonomy that is
characteristic of addiction. This initial loss of autonomy has left the addict vulnerable to
this subservience, since it is the addiction that gives the individual who controls him
undue influence. Furthermore, there need not be another party exercising undue influence
over the addict to experience a weakening of autonomy.
The individual who is able to supply his habit is unlikely to be at the control of
another as the consequence of addiction. It is sometimes postulated that addicts are
controlled by the drugs they abuse. Carl Elliot, for instance, writes that the addict must go
where addiction leads, because the addiction “holds the leash.”61 Elliot’s imagery is, of
course, a metaphor: an addiction cannot hold a leash, is not an agent, and has no desires
or goals of its own. If addiction involves the loss of autonomy, then it must somehow
undercut the addict’s ability to pursue his own goals. This essay contends that addicts
have compromised self-government even though they are not under the strict rule of
anyone else.62
4. ORGAN TRANSPLATATION AND ALCOHOLISM
4.1 Liver Transplantation and Alcoholism

59. Neil Levy, “Autonomy, Responsibility and the Oscillation of Preference,” in Addiction
Neuroethics: The Ethics of Addiction Neuroscience Research and Treatment, ed. Adrian Carter, Wayne
Hall, and Judy Illes (San Diego: Academic Press, 2012), 139-51; see especially pp. 140-41.
60. Levy, “Autonomy, Responsibility, and the Oscillation of Preference,” 139-51; see especially p.
141.
61. Levy, “Autonomy, Responsibility, and the Oscillation of Preference,” 139-51; see especially p.
141.
62. Levy, “Autonomy, Responsibility, and the Oscillation of Preference,” 139-51; see especially p.
141-42.

Alcoholic liver disease (ALD) is among the most common causes and indications
for orthotopic liver transplantation (OLT) in Europe and North America.63 ALD ranges
from steatosis or steatofibrosis to liver cirrhosis. Acute alcoholic hepatitis is a syndrome
presenting as acute liver damage following recent excessive drinking and is associated
with poor prognosis. Many patients with severe alcoholic hepatitis, whether occurring in
the previously healthy liver or in patients with established cirrhosis, fail to recover
despite abstinence and maximal medical therapy. The development of acute renal failure
in the midst of acute alcoholic hepatitis indicates an especially grim prognosis. Most
transplant programs in the United States and Europe require a minimal interval of
abstinence for six months prior to transplantation for patients with decompensated liver
disease. If there is no substantial improvement after three months of medical
management, including alcohol abstinence, the chances of spontaneous recovery by
patients with acute hepatitis and cirrhosis are poor.64
Liver transplantation in patients with alcoholic cirrhosis was first acknowledged
by the statement of the National Institutes of Health Consensus on Liver Transplantation
in 1983. As the statement notes, patients with alcoholic liver disease who are judged
likely to abstain from alcohol and have established clinical indicators of fatal outcome
may indeed be candidates for liver transplantation.65 In 1997, a conference (under the
auspices of the National Institutes of Health) on liver transplantation in ALD patients
confirmed the positive outcome of liver transplantation for most patients with alcoholic
liver cirrhosis, strongly encouraged efforts to understand the mechanisms leading some
patients to relapse, and called for adaptations to patient management protocols to restrict
risk of relapse and graft loss.66 The efficacy of liver transplantation for alcoholic cirrhosis
was best demonstrated by T. Poynard, who employed modeling techniques to exhibit
survival benefit when patients with advanced decompensation (i.e., 11-15 points on the
Child-Turcotte-Pugh (CTP) scoring system) underwent transplantation. There was no
survival benefit when alcoholic patients with better-compensated liver function were
transplanted.67
In the past, assessing the risk of death among patients with alcoholic cirrhosis has
depended on CTP classification. In recent years, however, a new prognostic system,
known as the Model for End-Stage Liver Disease (MELD), predicts liver disease severity
on the basis of serum creatinine, serum total bilirubin, and INR.68 Previous studies have
failed to demonstrate that other clinical manifestations of liver decompensation, such as
variceal hemorrhage, hepatic encephalopathy, new onset ascites, or spontaneous bacterial
peritonitis, were independent predictors of survival over and above the MELD score.
63. Patrizia Burra and Michael R. Lucey, “Liver Transplantation in Alcoholic Patients,”
Transplant International 18 (2005): 492-98; see especially p. 492.
64. There is only limited experience with transplantation in patients with acute alcoholic hepatitis
and minimal abstinence, and the current consensus in most European and North American transplant
centers is that patients with acute alcoholic hepatitis should not undergo liver transplantation. See Burra
and Lucey, “Liver Transplantation in Alcoholic Patients,” 492-98; see especially pp. 491-92.
65. Burra and Lucey, “Liver Transplantation in Alcoholic Patients,” 492-98; see especially p. 492.
66. Burra and Lucey, “Liver Transplantation in Alcoholic Patients,” 492-98; see especially p. 492.
67. Burra and Lucey, “Liver Transplantation in Alcoholic Patients,” 492-98; see especially p. 492.
68. Burra and Lucey, “Liver Transplantation in Alcoholic Patients,” 492-98; see especially p. 493.

Nonetheless, the onset of any of these features in an abstinent alcoholic should prompt
managing clinicians to consider referral to a transplant center.69 In addition to evaluating
the severity of liver disease and its complications, the pre-transplant investigation is
based on assessing the patient’s general health, especially the conditions and
comorbidities that might limit the potential for successful surgery, such as pancreatitis,
central and peripheral neuropathy, heart disease, myopathy, renal insufficiency, and poor
nutritional status. Chronic alcohol abuse is associated with impaired lymphocyte
recruitment, which may explain the increased morbidity and mortality of pulmonary
infections in alcoholic patients.70
4.2 Transplant Outcome and Survival Benefit for Alcoholic Patients
According to a 2011 report from the European Liver Transplant Registry, postOLT actuarial survival rates for end-stage ALD were higher than those of patients
transplanted for hepatitis viral infection.71 Similar survival rates for ALD patients have
been reported in the United States: 92% at one year; 86% at three and five years, and
76% at nine years.72 Indeed, ALD patients had similar, if not better, patient and graft
survival rates than other indications. Few studies are available on the outcome of patients
undergoing OLT for ALD in light of associated co-morbid factors of liver damage, the
most common of which is chronic hepatitis C virus (HCV). Despite data reporting a more
rapid progression of liver disease in immunocompetent patients with the combination of
ALD and HCV, a study by V. Aguilera and colleagues found that patients transplanted
for ALD plus HCV had a better survival rate than patients with HCV alone and a similar
survival rate to those with ALD alone.73
The long-term morbidity and survival rate of transplanted ALD patients can be
impaired by a high rate of medical complications, especially de novo cancer. In a group
of selected ALD patients who underwent OLT, A. Jain and colleagues reported that five
year patient and graft survival was significantly lower than that of non-alcoholic cirrhotic
controls, due primarily to cardiorespiratory, cerebrovascular, and neoplastic problems.74
Recent studies have shown a higher rate of de novo malignancy, not only in active
smokers after OLT, but also in patients with a history of smoking prior to transplantation,
which accounts for approximately 75% in the ALD population.75
A greater incidence of post-OLT neurological complications has also been
reported in patients transplanted for ALD compared to transplant recipients with other

69. Burra and Lucey, “Liver Transplantation in Alcoholic Patients,” 492-98; see especially p. 493.
70. Burra and Lucey, “Liver Transplantation in Alcoholic Patients,” 492-98; see especially p. 493.
71. 84% at 1 year; 73% at 5 years; and 58% at 10 years versus 82%, 70%, and 60%, respectively;
p = 0.04. See Annagiulia Gramenzi, Stafano Gitto, Fabio Caputo, Maurizio Biselli, Stafania Lorenzini,
Mauro Bernardi, and Pietro Andreone, “Liver Transplantation for Patients with Alcoholic Liver Disease:
An Open Question,” Digestive and Liver Disease 43 (2011): 843-49; see especially p. 845.
72. Gramenzi et al., “Liver Transplantation,” 843-49; see especially p. 845.
73. Gramenzi et al., “Liver Transplantation,” 843-49; see especially p. 845.
74. Gramenzi et al., “Liver Transplantation,” 843-49; see especially p. 845.
75. Gramenzi et al., “Liver Transplantation,” 843-49; see especially p. 845.

etiologies.76 A further concern with ALD patients undergoing OLT is the lack of
compliance with clinical protocols and immunosuppressive therapy. However, this seems
to be an assumption rather than an evidence-based conclusion. Although poor compliance
with immunosuppressive drugs was reported to be responsible for late rejection and graft
failure in heavy drinkers after OLT, several studies have demonstrated that ALD patients
show fewer episodes of acute cellular rejection than do patients transplanted for other
etiologies.77
These results raise numerous questions concerning whether a system based on
benefit calculation can be implemented equitably and practically. First, allocating organs
on the basis of projected survival benefit – herein understood as the balance between
waiting list mortality and post liver transplantation morality – represents a true paradigm
shift.78 The current principle in organ transplantation – namely, transplanting the sickest
patient first – has served well because it makes the allocation process transparent and
because the benefit of liver transplantation is mostly dominated by waiting list mortality.
Following the initial learning curve about the MELD score, the liver transplant
community has embraced the scoring system because of its simplicity and objectivity.79
The ultimate question of whether the benefit model should be adopted will depend
on the magnitude of the benefit: how many lives will eventually be saved by directing
some of the organs from one group of patients – namely, those at the highest risk of
waiting list mortality – to another – that is, those who are expected to have the better
post-transplantation outcome. If a benefit-based transplantation policy is to be adopted,
the transplant community must be willing to accept this departure from traditional
thinking. Because some patients with ALD will experience a good outcome, they will be
placed at higher priority than patients without ALD who face the same (or even higher)
risk of death while waiting.80
4.3 Predictors of Alcoholic Relapse After Liver Transplantation
Although transplant outcome and survival benefit remain crucial endpoints by the
Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients, an increasing emphasis has been placed on
morbidity after solid organ transplantation.81 The recurrence of the original disease, the
development of new diseases, the morbid consequences of immunosuppression, and the
mental health of the transplant recipient all contribute to a more comprehensive
understanding of the lives of transplant recipients. As such, alcohol abuse after
transplantation is an area of cardinal importance in assessing the recipient’s projected
76. Gramenzi et al., “Liver Transplantation,” 843-49; see especially p. 845.
77. Gramenzi et al., “Liver Transplantation,” 843-49; see especially p. 845.
78. Sumeet K. Asrani, W. Ray Kim, and Julie K. Heimbach, “Survival Benefit of Liver
Transplantation: One Size Fits All or Fits None?” Hepatology 50, no. 2 (2009): 352-54; see especially pp.
352-53.
79. Arsani et al., “Survival Benefit,” 352-54; see especially pp. 353-54.
80. Arsani et al., “Survival Benefit,” 352-54; see especially pp. 353-54.
81. Santiago Tome, Adnan Said, and Michael R. Lucey, “Addictive Behavior After Solid Organ
Transplantation: What Do We Know Already and What Do We Need to Know?” Liver Transplantation 14
(2008): 127-29; see especially p. 127.

quality of life. Unfortunately, there are numerous barriers to obtaining accurate data
about alcohol use by transplant recipients. Several of the most common methods, such as
self-reports, assessment by clinical findings, and collateral reports, are subject to bias. In
particular, the lack of an objective and reliable instrument to measure alcohol
consumption and the risk to the recipient that candor about alcohol use could harm his
chances of receiving future care from the transplant program encourage underreporting.82
Given the aforementioned caveat, the difficulty to apply tools of meta-analysis to
assess the frequency of addictive behavior after liver transplantation is understandable.
Against this backdrop, the study of M. A. Dew and colleagues is all the more laudable. In
their paper, Dew and colleagues successfully concentrate on liver transplant recipients
and seek to discover how frequently these patients’ addictions relapse after
transplantation.83 According to their meta-analysis, when alcoholic liver disease is the
pre-transplant diagnosis, six of 100 recipients per year will use alcohol after
transplantation, and less than three will resume heavy alcohol use. For the addiction
specialist, the maintenance of sobriety after transplantation is surprising.84 Possible
explanations include (i) the consequence of liver transplant recipients being a highly
selected population with less craving for alcohol than typical alcoholics, (ii) a result of
potential therapeutic properties of transplantation on addictions, or (iii) an underestimate
inasmuch as alcoholic transplant recipients hide their drinking.85
At least three pre-transplant factors assist in predicting alcoholic relapse after
transplantation: (i) lack of social support, (ii) family history of alcoholism, and (iii) less
than six months of abstinence from alcohol. Both social support and family history
resonate with studies conducted by George Vaillant in nontransplant alcoholic
populations.86 However, the six-month period of abstinence is a more questionable
prognostic tool.87 Use of the six-month rule to select alcoholic patients for liver
transplantation is nearly universal, and this exerts profound bias on meta-analysis insofar
as patients with the highest risk – those with less than six months of abstinence – are
likely to have been excluded before the data was collected.88
The vast majority of relapses in Vaillant’s 2003 follow-up study occurred before
the seventh year of abstinence.89 By analogy to the cancer-free period as a definition of
82. Tome et al., “Addictive Behavior,” 127-29; see especially p. 127.
83. See Mary Amanda Dew, Andrea F. DiMartini, Jennifer Steel, Annette De Vito Dabbs, Larissa
Myaskovsky, Mark Unruh, and Joel Greenhouse, “Meta-Analysis of Risk for Relapse to Substance Use
After Transplantation of the Liver or Other Solid Organs,” Liver Transplantation 14 (2008): 159-72.
84. Tome et al., “Addictive Behavior,” 127-29; see especially p. 128.
85. Tome et al., “Addictive Behavior,” 127-29; see especially p. 128.
86. George E. Vaillant, “The Natural History of Alcoholism and its Relationship to Liver
Transplantation,” Liver Transplant Surgery 3 (1997): 304-310.
87. However, some studies find the relationship directly indicative of relapse predictability. See,
for instance, Zamil Karim, Pongphob Intaraprasong, Charles H. Scudamore, Siegfried R. Erb, John G.
Soos, Elsie Cheung, Polly Cooper, Andrzej K. Buzckowski, Stephen W. Chung, Urs P. Steinbrecher, and
Eric M. Yoshida, “Predictors of Relapse to Significant Alcohol Drinking After Liver Transplantation,”
Canadian Journal of Gastroenterology 24, no. 4 (April 2010): 245-50.
88. Tome et al., “Addictive Behavior,” 127-29; see especially p. 128.
89. George E. Vaillant, “A 60-Year Follow-Up of Alcoholic Men,” Addiction 98 (2003): 1043-51.

cure, Vaillant concludes that a follow-up study of five years rather than one or two years
would be necessary to determine stable recovery from alcoholism.90 The absence of a link
between pre-transplant rehabilitation treatment and post-transplant alcoholic relapse is an
unexpected finding.91 Nevertheless, predicting future alcohol relapse remains imperfect,
and future studies will need to confront the issue of suitability for transplantation of
patients with durations of abstinence shorter than six months.92
5. MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ALCOHOLISM
5.1 Free Will, Moral Choice, and Alcoholism
Cognitive and affective neuroscience has generated significant insight into the
neurobiological basis of the capacity for practical and moral reasoning. Experiments
exposing human subjects to functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scans during
participation in stimulating cognitive tasks have conclusively identified interrelationships between the brain and mental states, each of which play vital roles in
deliberation and decision making. This comprehensive imaging has shown that desires,
beliefs, emotions, and intentions that serve as the impetus for action are mediated by the
interplay between cortical and subcortical networks in the brain.93 Some cognitive
neuroscientists and psychologists have contended that the relationship between the brain
and behavior indicates that cognitive function can be explained in terms of unconscious
mechanistic processes in the brain.94 This suggests that the source of one’s actions (i.e.,
one’s positive will) is not within one’s control,95 and that one’s mental state has no causal
role in manufacturing them.96
This essay understands free will as the capacity to respond to reasons and to make
choices in accord with one’s mental state by controlling the role each plays in one’s
actions.97 It therefore contends, contrary to the position above,98 that any reasonable
conception of free will is consistent with the notion that some cognitive states can
causally influence actions while having physical causes in the brain. That is, because the
brain generates the mind, and the mind in turn can influence the brain, a plausible
account of human (moral) agency must include both unconscious physical and conscious
mental states and events as causes of human action. This point suggests that
neuroscientific evidence cannot be used as a counterargument to the possibility of
90. George E. Vaillant, “A 60-Year Follow-Up of Alcoholic Men,” Addiction 98 (2003): 1043-51.
91. Rehabilitation support has been considered a good predictor of abstinence outside the context
of transplantation. See Tome et al., “Addictive Behavior,” 127-29; see especially p. 128.
92. Tome et al., “Addictive Behavior,” 127-29; see especially pp. 128-29.
93. This data has resulted in a more robust understanding of some aspects of the mind-break
relation. See Glannon, Brain, Body, and Mind, 41-71; see especially pp. 41-42.
94. Glannon is unspecific about who these individuals are, or precisely what their positions are.
See Glannon, Brain, Body, and Mind, 47-71; see especially p. 41.
95. For a fine analysis of the neuroethics of free will, see Patrick Haggard, “Neuroethics of Free
Will,” in The Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics, ed. Judy Illes and
Barbara J. Sahakian (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2011), 219-26.
96. Glannon, Brain, Body, and Mind, 47-71; see especially pp. 47-57.
97. Glannon, Brain, Body, and Mind, 47-71; see especially pp. 41.
98. Glannon, Brain, Body, and Mind, 47-71; see especially p. 41.

personal moral responsibility insofar as nothing about normal brain function suggests that
one lacks the capacity to choose and act freely.99 For better or worse and in varying
degrees, then, one is responsible one’s actions.
However, impaired control over voluntary behavior is a marked feature in
emerging neurobiological explanations of addiction, in clinical and diagnostic accounts,
and in debates about addiction nosology.100 There is growing evidence that chronic,
sustained abuse of alcohol is associated with neurocognitive changes and deficits, as
revealed by neuroimaging studies and neuropsychological testing.101 Others studies
propose that chronic exposure to alcohol sets in motion neurobiological processes that
result in the overvaluing of the reinforcing properties of a substance or behavior and an
undervaluing of natural reinforcers (e.g., maintaining relationships, going to work,
etc.).102 These processes are associated with impaired voluntary control over one’s
behavior. Similarly, individuals experiencing addiction have neurological impairments
that weaken their ability to make voluntary decisions in the service of long-term
outcomes. Hence, alcoholic cravings can manifest as such irresistible and powerful
psychological forces that someone with an addiction is not capable, at certain times, of
acting fully autonomously when the decision involves denying the persistence of
cravings.103
5.2 Moral Responsibility and Alcoholism
The primary reason philosophers have agued against providing patients with endstage ALD an equal chance to compete for liver transplantation is that alcoholics are
somehow morally responsible for their condition.104 The fundamental premises of the
argument are straightforward: (i) alcoholics are morally responsible for their medical
conditions; and (ii) patients who are morally responsible for their medical conditions
should be given lower priority for medical resources for their conditions when they are in
competition with those who are not morally responsible for their conditions. Following
this logic, the syllogistic conclusion is that alcoholics with end-stage ALD should be
given lower priority for medical resources (e.g., livers) when they are in competition with
those who are not morally responsible for their conditions.105
However, whether alcoholics are morally responsible for their liver conditions
depends on whether they are responsible for their alcoholism in the first place. If
99. Glannon, Brain, Body, and Mind, 47-71; see especially pp. 41-42.
100. T. Cameron Wild, Jody Wolfe, and Elaine Hyshka, “Consent and Coercion in Addiction
Treatment,” in Addiction Neuroethics: The Ethics of Addiction Neuroscience Research and Treatment, ed.
Adrian Carter, Wayne Hall, and Judy Illes (San Diego: Academic Press, 2012), 153-74; see especially p.
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101. Wild et al., “Consent and Coercion,” 153-74; see especially p. 155.
102. Wild et al., “Consent and Coercion,” 153-74; see especially p. 155.
103. Wild et al., “Consent and Coercion,” 153-74; see especially p. 155.
104. See, for instance, Walter Glannon, “Responsibility and Priority in Liver Transplantation,”
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 18 (2009): 23-35.
105. Dien Ho, “When Good Organs Go to Bad People,” Bioethics 22, no. 2 (2008): 77-83; see
especially p. 79.

alcoholics are not responsible for their alcoholism, then it would be wrong to treat them
differently from patients who develop liver diseases for reasons beyond their control. The
Center for Disease Control and Prevention defines alcoholism as “a primary, chronic
disease with genetic, psychosocial, and environmental factors influencing its
development and manifestations.”106 In addition, the American Medical Association
endorses the proposition that “drug dependencies, including alcoholism, are diseases” and
that “their treatment is a legitimate part of medical practice.”107
Much of the contemporary discussion over end-stage ALD and livers centers on
the question of whether alcoholism is a disease, traditionally understood. Nevertheless,
settling this question will not, in and of itself, determine the issue of responsibility for
that disease. Hepatitis C is undoubtedly a disease, but if one were to expose oneself
deliberately to the hepatitis C virus with the intention of developing the disease, one
would be both causally and morally responsible for the condition. Thus, the issue in
question is not whether alcoholism is a disease per se (though it most certainly is); rather,
the focus should be on whether alcoholics are morally responsible for their alcoholism.108
On this issue, philosophers continue to disagree. Walter Glannon, for instance,
argues that although environmental factors such as a family history of alcoholism,
preexisting psychiatric conditions, gender, and genetic factors all increase the risk of
developing alcoholism, alcoholics can still be morally responsible for their condition. He
contends that regardless of the high risk of developing alcoholism, one always has the
ability to refrain from drinking.109 Combine that ability with knowledge of one’s
dispositions and health risks (an argument Glannon appropriates from Book III of
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics110) along with acceptance of lower priority for liver
transplantation, one ought to be held responsible for one’s alcoholism and its associated
diseases.111 Robert Veatch advances a similar claim: while many conclude that
alcoholism has nonvoluntary components, it also contains significant opportunity for
voluntary decision making.112 Veatch’s conclusion is that if the alcoholic had the
opportunity for significant choice, then he should be responsible for the consequences,
including lower priority for liver transplantation.113
The disagreements about whether alcoholics cause their own end-stage ALD
reveal more than the problems confronted in determining their level of moral
responsibility. Take, for instance, the strategy of Alvin Moss and Mark Siegler of
106. Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2005, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/alcohol/faqs.htm; accessed 04/18/14.
107. American Medical Association, Drug Dependencies and Diseases (American Medical
Association, 1999), H-95.983.
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in Liver Transplantation,” 23-35; see especially pp. 26-27.
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112. Robert M. Veatch, Transplantation Ethics (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press,
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113. Ho, “When Good Organs Go to Bad People,” 77-83; see especially p. 79.

assigning responsibility on the basis of an alcoholic’s failure to seek treatment for his
alcoholism.114 This argument is meant to improve the attempt to hold alcoholics
responsible for their alcoholic abuse per se. However, this strategy seems no more
reliable in evaluating moral responsibility than simply blaming alcoholics for their
alcoholism.115
Against this logic, Dien Ho considers the alcoholic who has failed to seek
treatment because he is preoccupied with an ailing mother who requires constant
assistance.116 In Ho’s example, the son is too poor to hire help, and the closest Alcoholics
Anonymous meeting takes place in a city that is more than a two-hour drive away. Worse
still, he has no car. These hypothetical circumstances – which are surely realities for
some – illuminate Ho’s position: it would be unreasonable to conclude that the man in
this example is responsible enough for his condition that he should receive lower priority
for liver transplantation.117
Ho’s point is not that alcoholics should be excused entirely, but that the
assessment of moral responsibility in cases similar to his example are extremely difficult,
if not entirely impossible. Carl Cohen, Martin Benjamin, and the Ethics and Social
Impact Committee of Transplant and Health Policy Center have articulated this problem
well.118 They outline three technical problems with the use of moral responsibility as a
criteria for the allocation of livers to alcoholics: “(1) We have genuine and well-rounded
doubts about comparative degrees of voluntariness and, therefore, cannot pass judgment
fairly; (2) Even if we could assess degrees of voluntariness reliably, we cannot know
what penalties different degrees of misconduct deserve; (3) Judgments of this kind could
not be made consistently in our medical system.”119 Both problems (1) and (3) are
legitimate concerns. Problem (1) highlights the difficulties mentioned above; on the other
hand, problem (3) points out that even if it were possible to do so on a local level,
consistent assessment could not be ensured across different organizations.120 A mistake in
evaluating the moral responsibility of patients with end-stage ALD might mean denial of
vital organs and a high probability of death. Unless these technical difficulties are
overcome, there is a moral imperative to remain cautious and to avoid using moral
responsibility as legitimate criteria for allocating life-sustaining organs.121
5.3 The Provider-Patient Relationship in the Context of Alcoholism
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The difficulty of understanding pain and suffering is well known.122 Providers
encounter numerous difficulties in attempting to provide adequate relief to alcoholic
patients who struggle with morbidity and, ultimately, mortality.123 As Daniel Callahan
notes, human nature fixes no singular response to suffering, and for this reason it is often
arduous for providers to ascertain the behavior it might induce or the meaning it may
carry for a particular patient. Hence, compassionate medical care is necessarily
idiosyncratic; it must be tailor made to fit the individual in his history, culture, and
personal structure of understanding.124
In the context of alcoholism, the provider-patient relationship can be viewed as
the vehicle through which the relief of suffering – and so the honoring and upholding of
the mandates of licit fiduciary relationships – is achieved. Providers cannot avoid
becoming involved with patients and at the same time effectively allaying their suffering.
In fact, with alcoholic patients who are suffering it is essentially impossible to be in their
presence and remain indifferent. In its barest sense, to be concerned is to be involved.125
Every provider fears becoming closer to suffering patients, many of whom will die,
because such a relationship is sure to promise pain, sorrow, and loss.126 Yet it is only
through the compassionate connection with the alcoholic patient that pertinent
information flows to inform the provider of what the patient is feeling and even what
existential sensations he is experiencing. Through the same compassionate bond, then,127
the provider can offer a bridge over which the alcoholic can return from the isolation of
suffering.128
Introducing judgments of moral desert for the allocation of scarce resources
negatively impacts the fiduciary relationship between providers and patients. Moreover,
such assessments of moral “worth” risk undermining the fundamental nature of medicine.
When the alcoholic patient seeks medical assistance, one of his goals is to restore the
autonomy that is lost to addiction. The loss of autonomy or the inability to pursue
ordinary activities (that one could if healthy) is arguably what makes diseases and
ailments generally horrible. And, in petitioning a provider to help restore the loss of
autonomy, it is crucial that the provider learns about the values and preferences of the
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patient.129 In oncology care, for instance, the recommendation of a protocol typically
hinges on nonmedical considerations. A patient might be willing to accept a lower quality
of life brought by a chemotherapy regimen in favor of a higher success rate. A different
patient might view the long-term survival rate as secondary while prioritizing the
minimization of toxicity and the maintenance of a high quality of life during treatment.130
In this sense, providers play indispensible roles as health care advocates or consultants,
filtering the medical facts through the net of patient preferences and deriving a set of
therapeutic recommendations that best maximize patient wishes, including how best to
restore autonomy.131
The trust between providers and patients becomes essential if the model of
medicine sketched above is accurate. The patient must feel comfortable that the
information shared with the provider will not haunt or compromise his care at a later date.
Not only must this include the frank expression medical information, but also the ability
to share lifestyle information that can make a significant difference in determining the
proper treatment to recommend. For example, a patient diagnosed with hepatitis who
contracted the disease from drug use would require different care than someone who
contracted hepatitis through a blood transfusion.132 But if the patient learns that what he
tells the provider might significantly alter his chances of life-saving treatment, the patient
would have every incentive to withhold information that he believes (rightly or wrongly)
might jeopardize his interest. Given that providers can only make therapeutic
recommendations if they possess all of the relevant information, this sort of censorship
undermines the provider’s effectiveness as a health advocate.133
A medical model that allocates resources on the basis of moral desert also runs
counter to its institutional commitments. Such a system would give patients with medical
knowledge a significant advantage. They would presumably know what not to reveal to
their providers when the information would compromise their care. The product is a
system that would give higher priority to those who know how to manipulate it to their
advantage.134 Those patients who do not possess such knowledge would rightly worry
that their honesty in communication with providers might be self-destructive. Providers
would then no longer remain caretakers; they would become judges inheriting an
adversarial role. As long as medicine is committed to providing patients with equal care
regardless of their medical knowledge, and as long as it believes patients should have an
institution – a medical “safe haven” – to which to turn where they can receive medical
advocacy, allocating resources on the basis of moral desert would undermine both of
these goals.135
129. This example is found in Ho, “When Good Organs Go to Bad People,” 77-83; see especially
p. 81.
130. This example is found in Ho, “When Good Organs Go to Bad People,” 77-83; see especially
p. 81.
131. Ho, “When Good Organs Go to Bad People,” 77-83; see especially p. 81.
132. This example is found in Ho, “When Good Organs Go to Bad People,” 77-83; see especially
p. 81.
133. Ho, “When Good Organs Go to Bad People,” 77-83; see especially p. 81.
134. Ho, “When Good Organs Go to Bad People,” 77-83; see especially p. 82.
135. Ho, “When Good Organs Go to Bad People,” 77-83; see especially p. 82.

6. CONCLUSION
The aim and proposal of this essay has been to examine the notions of alcohol
addiction, transplantation candidacy, and moral responsibility with the intention of
positing the argument that employing moral desert as an allocation criteria to inhibit
alcoholic patients from equal consideration and treatment is, and ought to remain, at odds
with the fundamental nature of medicine and the functioning of the provider-patient
relationship. To secure the justification of this thesis, it has drawn from the twofold
premises that (i) compassionate medical practice – understood as the sympathetic
willingness to enter into the existential suffering of another in order to ameliorate the
anguish invoked by disease – rests on the fiduciary relationship shared between provider
and patient, and (ii) allocating medical goods according to moral desert rather than
existential disposition undermines the fundamental nature of medicine and the
functioning of the provider-patient relationship. To this end, the essay has been
successful.
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